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M. M. Bundy
SC 02583-65
NIE 42/14.2-65
22 January 1965

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SPECIAL ANNEX TO
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 42/14.2-65

The Korean Problem

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Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
22 JANUARY 1965

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Concurring:

Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
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1.5(c)
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1.5(c)
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THE KOREAN PROBLEM

ANNEX

MIG-21s AND SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES IN NORTH KOREA

DISCUSSION

1. *MIG-21s.* [REDACTED] of MIG-21s in North Korea. At Pukch'ang-ni airfield (39°30'N; 125°58'E) near Pyongyang, there were four MIG-21s [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

We believe, therefore, that there is a total of about nine MIG-21s in North Korea.

2. Flight activity of MIG-21s over North Korea has been detected since late December 1962. In early 1964, [REDACTED] the probability of seven MIG-21s in the air almost simultaneously over North Korea.

3. *Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs).* A probable SAM assembly area was detected for the first time in North Korea in December 1962 [REDACTED] It was located near Pyongyang and work on it had probably begun in the summer of 1962. The first confirmed SA-2 site in North Korea, also in the Pyongyang area, was found in [REDACTED] May 1963; it had been begun early in 1963. A second SA-2 site, again in the Pyongyang area, was located on [REDACTED] November 1964, confirming earlier reports from other sources. [REDACTED] FAN SONG missile guidance and tracking radar in the vicinity of the SA-2 sites, indicating that both are almost certainly operational.

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